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Abstract
In this paper we describe several player preferences in games with
N ≥ 2 players, in particular the caseN = 3, and use them to simplify game
trees, using the game of Clobber as our example. We show that, using a
fixed starting player and a certain ruleset, any short game can be simplified
to a value in a very concise set. Omitting the fixed starting player and
generalising the theory to more than 3 players remains a challenge.
1 Introduction
In the words of Aaron Siegel, and we could not have said it better ourselves:
Combinatorial game theory is the study of two-player games with no hidden
information and no chance elements. The theory assigns algebraic values to
positions in such games and seeks to quantify the algebraic and combinatorial
structure of their interactions.
Combinatorial Game Theory by Siegel [7] and Winning Ways for Your Math-
ematical Plays by Berlekamp, Conway and Guy [2] are the foremost literature
on combinatorial game theory. While the classical theory only considers two-
player games, in recent years, more and more work has been done to extend
the theory to games with more than two players, both for specifically three and
for an arbitrary finite number of players. Most of these efforts make restrictive
assumptions about the behaviour of the players, as mentioned by Cincotti [3].
Cincotti presents a theoretical framework to classify partisan games with an
arbitrary finite number of players. We decided to see how far we could simplify
the game tree using as few assumptions as possible, using the game of Clobber
as an example to apply our theory.
In Section 2 we define the games we study in this paper and the notation we use
to represent their values. Section 3 introduces the game of Clobber and how to
extend it to an N -player game. In Section 4 we present our simplification rules,
the results of which we discuss in Section 5. Finally, we summarise our findings
and conclusions in Section 6, in which we also suggest several areas for further
research.
This research was done by the first author as a Master research project at the
Leiden Institute of Advanced Computer Science (LIACS), Leiden University,
under the supervision of the second author.
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2 N-player games
We consider a game with N ≥ 2 players, where we are most interested in the case
N > 2. The players are numbered 1, 2, . . . , N . They take turns, where player
i+1 succeeds player i (if i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}), and player 1 succeeds player N .
Player 1 starts the game. The last player that can make a legal move, wins the
game. This is called normal play. If a player cannot make a valid move, their
turn is skipped. We assume that at least one player can make a move in the
initial position. Furthermore, we assume the game to be converging: positions
can be ordered in a game tree without backlinks.
We first construct the full game tree, starting from the initial position. Leaves
are positions where no player can move. The value of such a node is equal to
the number of the winner. These values represent unconditional wins for the
corresponding player.
Now we can recursively label all nodes, in the following bottom-up way. The
general value of a non-leaf position P with player i to play (note that i is
formally part of P , and could therefore be omitted) is the list L with all unique
values of the children, using some fixed ordering. The underlying intuition is
that the list elements represent the choices for the player to move. A value L
thus represents a tree, with the leaves having the aforementioned single number
values. L is said to contain a value a if some node in the tree represented by L
has the value a.
Note that if all children have the same value, this will also be the value of the
parent. We identify a list [x] with x a leaf position with its only member x: we
use 3 instead of [3]. However, note that, e.g., [1, 3] differs from [[1, 3]]. Here, the
first list denotes a situation where the player to move can select 1 or 3 as the
winner, whereas the second list passes this option to the next player to move.
But [[[3]]] = 3.
Of course, the order of the list elements does not matter and multiple occurrences
of elements can be represented with single occurrences.
We mention some examples:
Example 1. Suppose the children have values 2, 2, 2 and 3, respectively;
then the parent has value [2, 3]. The parent contains the values 2, 3 and
[2, 3].
Note that, if it is player 1’s turn, this value makes player 1 a so-called
kingmaker. As also noted by Propp [6], the player has no winning move,
but their action determines which of the other players will win.
Example 2. Suppose the children have values 2, [2, 3], [2, 3] and [1, [1, 3]],
respectively; then the parent has value [2, [2, 3], [1, [1, 3]]]. The parent con-
tains the values 1, 2, 3, [1, 3], [2, 3], [1, [1, 3]] and [2, [2, 3], [1, [1, 3]]].
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3 Clobber
Clobber is a partisan game consisting of an undirected graph, usually a grid
graph, with the vertices containing a black or white token or being empty.
A player must move one of their tokens to an adjacent vertex containing a
token of the opponent. The player’s token replaces, “clobbers”, the opponent’s
token, which is then removed from the game. The first player unable to make
such a move loses the game. Note that Clobber is dicotic, formally known as
all-small [7, pages 60–63], meaning that both players can move from every
nonempty position. In competitions, Clobber is usually played on a checker-
board with black tokens on the black squares and white tokens on the white
ones. Human competitions usually use a 5 × 6 board while computer competi-
tions generally use larger board sizes such as 10× 10.
For further reading on Clobber, we recommend the 2005 paper “An introduction
to Clobber” [1] and Siegel’s 2013 book on combinatorial game theory [7, pages
146–149]. Recent work on Clobber was done in 2016 by Griebel and Uiterwijk [4],
who combined combinatorial game theory with an α-β-solver to solve larger and
more complex Clobber boards.
To extend Clobber into an N -player game, a vertex now contains a number
between 0 and N , 0 meaning the vertex is empty and a number i ≥ 1 mean-
ing the vertex contains a token from the corresponding player i. A valid move
now consists of clobbering an adjacent token belonging to any other player. As
defined in Section 2, a player unable to make a valid move will skip their turn
— and can never move again — and the last player to make a valid move wins
the game.
We now give some examples of three-player Clobber games on 1×n boards and
their values. In all examples, we assume it is player 1’s turn.
Example 3. 2 1 3 has value 1. Player 1 can clobber either player 2 or 3
and wins in both cases.
Example 4. 1 2 2 2 3 has value [[1,3]]. Player 1 has no choice but to
clobber player 2. Player 2 then must clobber either player 1 or 3, after which
the other one will clobber them in return and win. Player 2 thus chooses
the winner.
Example 5. 1 2 3 2 1 3 has value [[1,3],[1,[1,2]],[2,3]]. This can still
easily be checked by hand, which we leave as an exercise for the reader.
Example 6. 1 2 3 2 1 3 2 3 2 1 has value [[[1, 3, [3, [[1, 3]]], [[1, 3,
[2, 3]], [2, 3, [1, 2]]], [[[1, 2]]]], [3, [2, 3], [2, [1, 3]], [[1, 2]]], [3, [3, [1, 3]], [3,
[[1, 3]]], [[1, 3], [2, 3]], [[1, 3]]], [3, [[1, 2], [2, 3]]], [[1, 3], [3, [1, 2], [[1, 2]]], [[1,
2, 3], [1, 2, [2, 3]]]], [[1, 3], [3, [1, 2], [[1, 2]]], [[1, 3], [2, 3, [2, 3]], [2, 3]]]], [[2,
[1, 3], [2, 3], [[1, 3]]], [2, [3, [1, 3]]], [3, [1, [2, 3]], [[1, 3, [2, 3]]], [[1, 3], [[1, 2]]],
[[2, 3], [[1, 3]]]], [[1, 3], [1, [2, 3]], [3, [2, 3]], [[2, 3]]], [[1, [1, 2, 3], [2, 3, [2, 3]]],
[2, 3], [2, [[1, 2]]]], [[2, 3], [2, [1, 2]], [[1, 2, [2, 3]], [1, 2]]]], [[2, [2, 3]], [2, [3,
[1, 3]], [3, [2, 3]]], [2, [3, [1, 3]]], [3, [2, 3], [[1, 3]], [[2, 3], [[1, 3]]]], [[1, 2], [1,
3
3, [1, 3]], [2, 3]], [[1, 2], [2, 3]]], [[[1, 2], [1, [2, 3]], [2, 3]], [[1, 2], [2, 3]], [[1, 3,
[1, 2]]], [[2, 3]], [[3, [1, 3]], [[1, 3]]]]]. Some spaces added for readability. We
do not recommend to check this one without the assistance of a computer.
4 Simplifying the game tree
We have seen from the examples in Section 3 that the length and complexity
of values grow rather fiercely for larger board sizes. To counter this, for games
with N = 3, we introduce an additional notation, give several general, syn-
tactic simplification rules and experiment with several player preferences and
the semantic simplification rules they infer. Note that these do not rely on any
rules specific to Clobber and should instead be applicable to any short game, as
defined in [7, page 54].
4.1 Simple values
For N = 3, we use 1¯ (pronounced “1 bar”) to denote the value [2, 3]. 1¯ can be
interpreted as the complement of 1, as it consists of all single number values
except for 1 itself. Similarly, we use 2¯ for [1, 3] and 3¯ for [1, 2]. Following the same
intuition, we use the notation 1¯ (pronounced “1 bar bar”) for [2¯, 3¯] ([[1, 3], [1, 2]]),
and so forth. Due to the large number of bars in larger and more complex values,
we will often omit the actual bars and instead denote their number in subscript;
for instance, 12 = 1¯ and 16 =
¯¯
1¯. We use the notation ai, a being the base value
and i ≥ 0 being the exponent, to denote a value consisting of the list containing
the values {bi−1 | b 6= a}, with a0 representing a, the unconditional win for player
a. We call values that can be represented using this notation simple values. We
call all other values complex values.
4.2 Syntactic simplifications
We give several operations, denoted by “⇒”, that can be performed to sim-
plify the syntax of the game tree without semantically changing the possibilities
available to the players or the possible outcomes of the game tree.
Rule 1. For a simple value x: [x]⇒ x.
In our previous notation, there was a semantic difference between, e.g.,
[1, 3] and [[1, 3]], as a different player makes the choice between the values
1 and 3. However, a simple value encapsulates this as its base value is the
player making the choice, e.g. 2¯ can be interpreted as “Regardless of what
else happens, at some moment player 2 will make a choice between two
4
moves leading to positions with values 1 and 3.” Therefore, 2¯ can be used
to represent both [1, 3] and [[1, 3]].
In general, a simple value defines a complete binary game tree, which con-
tains all possible outcomes, the choices leading to these outcomes and which
player makes which choice. Of course, the value 2¯ could represent a game
where a hundred moves are played without any choice being involved, or
where every choice leads to positions with the same values, before player
2 makes their deciding choice, and several hundred more moves could be
played after this choice, but this does not change the outcome.
Rule 2. For a (simple or complex) value x with N = 3: [[[x]]]⇒ x.
Or, in general, with N the number of players: x = [[[. . . [[[︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
x]]] . . .]]].
This rule again uses the argument that we can omit nodes of the game tree
if they do not influence the possible outcomes or the choices leading to them
in any way. Two values x and [[[x]]] are only different in that the latter has
three extra moves leading up to the same choice. As these moves do not
influence the choice or its outcomes, and the player who is to make these
choices is the same, the values are semantically equivalent and we can omit
the three sets of square brackets.
Rule 3. For (simple or complex) values x1, . . . , xm and y1, . . . , yk with
N = 3:
[x1, . . . , xm, [[[y1, . . . , yk]]]]⇒ [x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yk].
Or, in general, with N the number of players:
[x1, . . . , xm, [[[. . . [[[︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
y1, . . . , yk]]] . . .]]]]⇒ [x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yk]
This rule can be used together with Rule 2 to merge nodes with their
ancestors in the game tree if no choices by other players were involved on
the path between them. This builds upon the intuition used in Rule 2 that,
as long as the intermediate nodes where other players can make a move
do not branch, the same player keeps making every choice, giving them
complete control over the possible outcomes. The outcomes can thus be
merged into the children of a single node, a single list, as this does not
reduce the possibilities available to the players.
For instance, this rule can be used to simplify [1¯, 2¯] into 1¯, assuming it is
player 1’s turn. As 1¯ = [2¯, 3¯], player 1 has the choice between choosing for 2¯
immediately or taking a different path in which they will eventually choose
between 2¯ and 3¯. In the end, player 1 chooses between 2¯ and 3¯ without any
influence from the other players, so the original choice can be simplified to
[2¯, 3¯] = 1¯.
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4.3 Player preferences
Until now, we have only considered simplification rules that do not actually
change the semantics of the game tree. We now consider possible player pref-
erences to actually discard certain values and thus prune the game tree. We
define a binary relation over the values of game trees: a value X is said to be
weaker than or equal to a value Y from the perspective of player p, written as
X ≤p Y , if they represent the same value or if the relation can be inferred from
the values of their children. Formally, with X = [x1, . . . , xn], Y = [y1, . . . , ym],
we define the relation ≤p as follows:
Definition 7. X ≤p Y ⇔ (X = Y ) or (∀i : xi ≤p Y ) or (∀i, j : xi ≤p yj)
With X = Y , we mean that X and Y are exactly the same values after
using syntactic simplifications as in Section 4.2.
Using this definition, we can define three more relations:
Two values X and Y are equal to each other from the perspective of player
p, written as X =p Y , if they are both weaker than or equal to each other.
Formally:
Definition 8. X =p Y ⇔ X ≤p Y and Y ≤p X
A value X is strictly weaker than a value Y from the perspective of player p,
written as X <p Y , if X is weaker than or equal to Y and they are not equal.
Formally:
Definition 9. X <p Y ⇔ X ≤p Y and X 6=p Y
A value X is incomparable with a value Y from the perspective of player p,
written as X 6≷p Y , if X is not weaker than or equal to Y and Y is not weaker
than or equal to X . Formally:
Definition 10. X 6≷p Y ⇔ X p Y and Y p X
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4.4 Selfish play
A logical first player preference to introduce would be a selfish player — when
faced with a choice between two values, they will choose the value that is in
their own best interest. In particular, this implies that the player will always
choose a move where they will certainly win. If no such move is present, they
will choose a move where they might win. Formally, it allows us to define two
additional rules. We use the term selfish game to denote a game where all players
are selfish.
Rule 4. Assuming a selfish player a, it being player a’s turn, and x being
an arbitrary value that is neither a guaranteed win or loss, then: x <a a.
If player a can make a move leading to unconditional victory, they will
choose to do so and disregard all other moves.
Rule 5. Assuming a selfish player a, it being player a’s turn, x being an
arbitrary value that is neither a guaranteed win or loss, and y being an
arbitrary value that is a guaranteed loss, then: y <a x.
As player a plays to win and the value y and c represents a guaranteed loss,
the player will prefer any value x that still has some possibility, no matter
how small, to lead to a victory.
We can use the above rules to show that 3¯ <1 2¯. After all, 3¯ = [1¯, 2¯]. Rule 5 gives
us that 1¯ <1 2¯. We can conclude from this that 3¯ <1 2¯. Note that using this
and Definition 7, we can also show that [2¯, 3¯] <1 2¯, and then that [2¯, [2¯, 3¯]] <1 2¯,
and so on. However, 2¯ and 2¯ for instance are incomparable. Since we have no
way of comparing 2 and 3 from the perspective of player 1, we also have no
way of comparing 2¯ and 3¯ and so forth. This significantly limits the gains of
the simplification rules so far. Furthermore, we would actually like to be able to
compare 2¯ and 2¯; both have a single path where player 1 wins, but 2¯ has three
paths where player 1 loses compared to a single path in 2¯, and player 1 has
no way to steer towards its winning path in either case. Although we assume
nothing about the preferences of players 2 and 3 beyond them playing selfishly,
it would seem wise to prefer 2¯ over 2¯ as player 1. Therefore, we need something
more.
4.5 Prudently selfish play
To counter the issue we raised at the end of Section 4.4, we introduce the notion
of a prudently selfish player, or a prudent player for short — and prudent game
for a game with only prudent players. A prudent player will, in addition to
playing selfishly, when choosing between two values X and Y where neither is
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strictly weaker than the other, avoid one if it can lead to a situation that is worse
than or incomparable to every single situation in the other one. If such a choice
occurs where the option X is discarded in favour of Y , we say that, from the
point of view of player p, X is prudently weaker than Y , written as X <Pp Y .
Formally, with X = [x1, . . . , xn], Y = [y1, . . . , ym], we define the relation <
P
p
and its corresponding incomparability relation 6≷Pp as follows:
Definition 11. X <Pp Y ⇔ X <p Y or (∀i, j : (xi <
P
p yj or xi 6≷
P
p
yj) and ∃i, j : (xi <
P
p yj))
Definition 12. X 6≷Pp Y ⇔ X ≮
P
p Y and Y ≮
P
p X
We now show that this new relation <Pp allows us to compare almost every
single pair of simple values and that we can use it to simplify any complex value
to a single simple value. To this end, we prove with three theorems that this
holds for the relation <P1 , from the perspective of player 1. The proofs for the
relations <P2 and <
P
3 are the same.
First we prove that the values 2i and 3i are incomparable and that 1i is com-
parable with 2i and 3i, with the sign depending on the parity of i:
Theorem 13.
∀i ≥ 0 : 2i 6≷
P
1 3i ∧
{
2i <
P
1 1i ∧ 3i <
P
1 1i when i is even
1i <
P
1 2i ∧ 1i <
P
1 3i when i is odd
We prove this by induction. Our base case is i = 0: 2 6≷P1 3. It can easily
be determined that 2 and 3 are not comparable under the rules we have
defined. Furthermore, we determine that 2 <P1 1 and 3 <
P
1 1. Both of these
can be easily checked.
For our induction step, we assume our hypothesis to hold for all 0 ≤ i ≤
k. We now prove this to induce that the hypothesis also holds for k + 1.
Consider the game trees for the values 1k+1, 2k+1 and 3k+1:
1k+1
2k 3k
2k+1
1k 3k
3k+1
1k 2k
We now attempt to compare 2k+1 with 3k+1. There are two ways for the
two values to be comparable: 2k+1 <
P
1 3k+1 or 3k+1 <
P
1 2k+1. From our
induction hypothesis, it follows that 2k 6≷
P
1 3k. What remains is to compare
1k with 2k and 3k with 1k. We first consider the option 2k+1 <
P
1 3k+1. Since
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we know from our induction hypothesis that 1k is comparable both with
2k and 3k, we know that both 1k <
P
1 2k and 3k <
P
1 1k must hold. This is
impossible by our induction hypothesis. The second option, 3k+1 <
P
1 2k+1,
can be analogously proven to be impossible. We conclude that 2k+1 6≷
P
1
3k+1.
We then compare 1k+1 with 2k+1. It follows from our induction hypothesis
that 2k 6≷
P
1 3k. Furthermore, from hypothesis we know that either 1k <
P
1
2k ∧ 1k <
P
1 3k or 2k <
P
1 1k ∧ 3k <
P
1 1k. In the first case, when k is even, it
follows that 2k+1 <
P
1 1k+1. In a similar fashion it then holds that 3k+1 <
P
1
1k+1. In the second case, when k is odd, the inverse holds: 1k+1 <
P
1 2k+1 ∧
1k+1 <
P
1 3k+1.
Together, these comparisons show that our hypothesis also holds for k+ 1.
By mathematical induction, the statement holds for all i ≥ 0.
Second we prove that the value 1i+1 is incomparable with the values 2i and 3i:
Theorem 14. ∀i ≥ 0 : 1i+1 6≷
P
1 2i ∧ 1i+1 6≷
P
1 3i
For this, again consider the tree for 1i+1:
1i+1
2i 3i
From our previous proof, it holds that 2i 6≷
P
1 3i. It follows that there exists
no child value of 1i+1 which is prudently weaker than a child value of 2i
and vice versa. Thus, we conclude that 1i+1 6≷
P
1 2i. Analogously, it holds
that 1i+1 6≷
P
1 3i.
Finally, we prove that the following ordering holds:
Theorem 15. {1¯, 2, 3} <P1 {
¯¯1, 2¯, 3¯} <P1 {
¯¯
1¯,
¯¯
2,
¯¯
3} <P1 . . . <
P
1 {
¯¯
1, ¯¯2, ¯¯3} <P1
{1¯, 2¯, 3¯} <P1 1 where values within sets of brackets are incomparable with
each other.
We prove this by induction. Our base case consists of the ordering of the
values 1, 1¯, 2, 2¯, 3 and 3¯. Since 1 is a guaranteed victory and 1¯, 2 and 3 are
guaranteed losses, it is easy to place them in the ordering. We know already
that 1¯, 2 and 3 are incomparable. Since 2¯ and 3¯ are neither guaranteed
victories or guaranteed losses, they are weaker than 1 and stronger than
1¯, 2 and 3. We know already that they are incomparable with each other.
Combining all this, we obtain the following ordering:
{1¯, 2, 3} <P1 {2¯, 3¯} <
P
1 1
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For our induction step, we assume the following ordering to hold for some
i > 1:
{11, 2, 3} <
P
1 {13, 22, 32} <
P
1 . . . <
P
1 {12i−1, 22i−2, 32i−2} <
P
1
{22i−1, 32i−1} <
P
1 {12i−2, 22i−3, 32i−3} <
P
1 . . . <
P
1 {12, 21, 31} <
P
1 10
We want to prove that the next values, 12i, 12i+1, 22i, 22i+1, 32i and 32i+1,
are inserted in the ordering as follows:
. . . <P1 {12i−1, 22i−2, 32i−2} <
P
1 {12i+1,22i,32i} <
P
1 {22i+1,32i+1} <
P
1
{12i, 22i−1, 32i−1} <
P
1 {12i−2, 22i−3, 32i−3} <
P
1 . . .
We prove this in four steps:
I) 12i
22i−1 32i−1
We know by induction hypothesis that {22i−1, 32i−1} <
P
1 12i−2.
Therefore, 12i <
P
1 12i−2. We know by induction hypothesis that
{22i−1, 32i−1} <
P
1 {22i−3, 32i−3}. Therefore, 12i <
P
1 {22i−3, 32i−3}.
We know from our induction hypothesis that {22i−1, 32i−1} <
P
1
{12i−2, 22i−3, 32i−3} and we know from a previous proof that 12i 6≷
P
1
{22i−1, 32i−1}.
Combining the above gives us the ordering {12i, 22i−1, 32i−1} <
P
1
{12i−2, 22i−3, 32i−3}.
II) 22i+1
12i 32i
12i−1 22i−1
32i+1
12i 22i
12i−1 32i−1
We know already that {12i, 22i−1, 32i−1} 6≷
P
1 {22i−1, 32i−1}, and
by induction hypothesis that {12i−1} <
P
1 {22i−1, 32i−1}. It follows
that {22i, 32i} <
P
1 {22i−1, 32i−1} and thus that {22i+1, 32i+1} <
P
1
{22i−1, 32i−1}. We know from a previous proof that {22i, 32i} <
P
1 12i.
Therefore, {22i+1, 32i+1} <
P
1 12i. We know from a previous proof that
12i 6≷
P
1 {22i−1, 32i−1}.
Combining the above gives us the ordering {22i+1,32i+1} <
P
1
{12i, 22i−1, 32i−1}.
III) 22i+1
12i 32i
32i+1
12i 22i
We know from a previous proof that {22i, 32i} <
P
1 {12i}. It follows
that {22i, 32i} <
P
1 {22i+1, 32i+1}. We know from a previous proof that
12i+1 <
P
1 {22i+1, 32i+1} and 12i+1 6≷
P
1 {22i, 32i}.
Combining the above gives us the ordering {12i+1,22i,32i} <
P
1
{22i+1,32i+1}.
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IV) 12i+1
22i 32i
22i
12i−1 32i−1
32i
12i−1 22i−1
We know from our induction hypothesis that 12i−1 <
P
1 {22i−1, 32i−1}.
Therefore, 12i−1 <
P
1 {22i, 32i}, which lets us conclude that 12i−1 <
P
1
12i+1. We know from our induction hypothesis that 12i−1 6≷
P
1
{22i−2, 32i−2} and that {22i−2, 32i−2} <
P
1 {22i, 32i}. It follows that
12i−1 <
P
1 {22i, 32i} and that {22i−2, 32i−2} <
P
1 {22i, 32i}. From this,
we can conclude that {22i−2, 32i−2} <
P
1 12i+1.
Combining the above gives us the ordering {12i−1, 22i−2, 32i−2} <
P
1
{12i+1,22i,32i}.
Together, these four steps conclude our proof by induction.
It follows that a prudent player will always simplify a list of simple values to a
single simple one. They can not construct complex values. After all, almost every
single pair of simple values is comparable, allowing the player to discard one of
them. The only values incomparable with each other, from the perspective of
player 1, are 2i, 3i and 1i+1. [2i, 3i] = 1i+1 and any combination including 1i+1
can be simplified to 1i+1. This leads us to our final theorem:
Theorem 16. All prudent short games with N = 3 and a given starting
player result in a single simple value.
As mentioned in Section 2, we assume the game to be converging. We can
thus construct the full game tree. As we are given a fixed starting player,
we can then determine for each node in the tree which player makes the
corresponding choice. If we label the nodes in a bottom-up way, we can apply
Theorem 15 to obtain a simple value in every node, as any combination of
simple values, from the perspective of a given player, can be merged into
another simple value.
It might be interesting to note that the number of different values for a given
starting player thus becomes at most linear in the size of the board. As each
move, and thus each level in the game tree, removes a single token from the
game and possibly isolates more tokens, the depth of the game tree — and
therefore also the exponent of a simple value — can not exceed the number of
initial tokens, which in turn can not exceed the number of vertices n on the
game board. As we have three different bases for simple values and at most
n different exponents (0, . . . , n − 1 as you need at least two tokens to make a
move), this gives us at most 3n different values or outcome classes.
However, we have now fixed a starting player, so a position now consists of a
configuration of the board and the player whose turn it is. Naturally, different
values can be assigned to the same configuration depending on the starting
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player. For instance, the game 1 2 is won either by player 1, if player 1 or
player 3 starts, or by player 2, if player 2 starts. A different notation would be
needed to construct a value that includes all possible starting players, as has
been done for two-player games in classical combinatorial game theory.
Indifference
Another possible approach, instead of playing prudently, would be to consider
the values 2 and 3 to be equal from the perspective of player 1, so 2 =1 3. We
call this an indifferent player, as the player does not differentiate between the
outcomes where they lose. They are simply losses, no matter which other player
won. The assumption of an indifferent selfish player leads to the same ordering
as in Theorem 15, with two differences: the ordering uses the relation <1 instead
of <P1 , and the values within sets of brackets are equal to each other instead of
being incomparable. The proof is quite similar to the one in Theorem 15, which
we will leave as an exercise to the reader.
5 Simplification results
In this section, we analyse the efficiency of our simplification rules by computing
the number of different possible values for games of three-player Clobber on a
1× n board using the different simplification rules.
Recall Example 6 of a 1 × 10 board, which had a rather large value of 675
characters, excluding the spaces added for readability:
Unsimplified: [[[1, 3, [3, [[1, 3]]], [[1, 3, [2, 3]], [2, 3, [1, 2]]], [[[1, 2]]]], [3,
[2, 3], [2, [1, 3]], [[1, 2]]], [3, [3, [1, 3]], [3, [[1, 3]]], [[1, 3], [2, 3]], [[1, 3]]], [3,
[[1, 2], [2, 3]]], [[1, 3], [3, [1, 2], [[1, 2]]], [[1, 2, 3], [1, 2, [2, 3]]]], [[1, 3], [3, [1,
2], [[1, 2]]], [[1, 3], [2, 3, [2, 3]], [2, 3]]]], [[2, [1, 3], [2, 3], [[1, 3]]], [2, [3, [1,
3]]], [3, [1, [2, 3]], [[1, 3, [2, 3]]], [[1, 3], [[1, 2]]], [[2, 3], [[1, 3]]]], [[1, 3], [1, [2,
3]], [3, [2, 3]], [[2, 3]]], [[1, [1, 2, 3], [2, 3, [2, 3]]], [2, 3], [2, [[1, 2]]]], [[2, 3],
[2, [1, 2]], [[1, 2, [2, 3]], [1, 2]]]], [[2, [2, 3]], [2, [3, [1, 3]], [3, [2, 3]]], [2, [3, [1,
3]]], [3, [2, 3], [[1, 3]], [[2, 3], [[1, 3]]]], [[1, 2], [1, 3, [1, 3]], [2, 3]], [[1, 2], [2,
3]]], [[[1, 2], [1, [2, 3]], [2, 3]], [[1, 2], [2, 3]], [[1, 3, [1, 2]]], [[2, 3]], [[3, [1, 3]],
[[1, 3]]]]]
Our syntactic rules turn out to be inapplicable in this case, but the assumption
of three selfish players makes a huge difference, reducing the value to a simple
one:
Selfish: [[[1,2]]].
Note that this assumes that the first turn is player 1’s. Three prudent players
will get the same result, although they might express it as a simple value:
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Prudent: 31 (= [[[1,2]]]), brackets as seen from the perspective of player 1.
To give a different example, where the assumption of prudent players sim-
plifies the value more than just selfish players, consider the following game:
1 3 2 3 2 3 1 2 3 . This gives us the following values:
Selfish: [[[1,2],[[2,3],[[1,3]]]],[[1,2],[[2,3]]],[[[2,3],[[1,3]]]]]
Prudent: 32 (= [[[[2,3],[[1,3]]]]])
Table 1 shows the number of unique possible values for boards of size 1 × n
with 2 ≤ n ≤ 13. We only analysed the configurations that do not occur on
earlier board sizes. This means we skipped all configurations with a 0 at either
extremity of the board or with at least two consecutive 0’s, as these configur-
ations would have already occurred at some smaller board size1. We also took
mirror symmetry into account, so we only analysed configurations whose string
representation is lexicographically greater than or equal to their reverse’s. Fi-
nally, following our assumption in Section 2, we only considered configurations
where at least one move is possible for some player. Because of this, the number
of games we analysed is less than the number of actual possible configurations,
which is 4n for a 1×n board. Note that this also means that the number of val-
ues shown in the table is the number of different possible values at the starting
position. Once the players proceed to make moves, different values may occur.
For instance, with selfish players, some values occur on 1 × 10 boards that do
not occur on 1× 11 boards. Furthermore, we assume all players share the same
preference — we have not analysed a game in which, for instance, only one
of the players is prudent — and we assume that it is player 1’s turn in each
starting position, which seems to lower the number of possible values. On a
1 × 4 board with three prudent players, the value 11 does occur while 21 does
not. Were player 2 the starting player, the value 21 would have occurred, for
instance on the board 1 2 2 3 . However, our results are from the perspective
of the starting player, and we can always renumber the players so their number
matches their turn order, to obtain a value from our results.
As the table shows, the syntactic rules do reduce the number of unique values,
but only very slightly. Selfish play reduces the numbers significantly on smaller
board sizes, but the number of values still grows exponentially and the reduction
factor seems to decrease as the board grows larger. This could be explained
with the incomparability of the more complex values, as mentioned at the end
of Section 4.4, as these more complex values occur more often on larger boards
and a combination of two such values usually can not be simplified. As argued
at the end of Section 4.5, prudent play results into a linear upper bound on the
number of values. This is strenghtened by the results shown in the table, which
also show that the upper bound of 3n is not sharp.
As a specific example, let us consider the single value that “disappears” when
going from selfish to prudent play on a 1× 8 board. This is [[1,3],[[1,2],[[2,3]]]],
1Recall that a 0 is an empty vertex.
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Board length Games analysed Unsimplified Syntactic Selfish Prudent
2 3 2 2 2 2
3 15 3 3 3 3
4 60 7 7 4 4
5 243 21 21 5 5
6 924 77 77 7 7
7 3 609 506 501 8 8
8 13 704 2 408 2 398 9 8
9 52 497 9 777 9 748 20 10
10 199 329 36 407 36 326 154 11
11 758 556 128 345 128 179 2 163 13
12 2 878 512 434 571 434 274 30 378 13
13 10 949 499 1 441 816 1 441 334 256 975 14
Table 1: Number of Clobber games analysed and unique resulting values adding
the different simplification methods. Note that the selfish and prudent columns
also use the syntactic simplifications.
or, using the bar notation, [2¯, 2¯]. This should indeed be simplified to just 2¯ by
a prudent player 1. The other values occurring in selfish play are 1, 2, 3, 1¯, 2¯,
3¯, 1¯ and 2¯, which are all already simple values. As argued before, the value 3¯
does not occur because we assume player 1 to be the starting player. We have
also verified by hand that the reduction from 20 selfish to 10 prudent values for
1× 9 is correct.
6 Conclusions and further research
In this paper, we have attempted to use simple player preferences to simplify the
game tree in games with N ≥ 2 players, and particularly with N = 3, using the
game of Clobber as an example. We have presented two sets of generic player
preferences which significantly reduce the number of unique values for arbitrary
game positions — our simplification rules for prudent play lead to a linear
upper bound on this number for three-player games. These rules apply both to
impartial and partisan games and are shown to work on Clobber. We postpruned
our game trees, unfortunately meaning we still had to compute the entire tree
before being able to simplify. While we have managed to significantly reduce
the number of outcome classes for game values, our rules did not (significantly)
lower the time needed to compute these values.
As we have only considered the outcome classes and not the victory margins, it
is impossible to simply determine the value of a complex position from the values
of its disjoint components. For instance, consider the games 1 2 , 1 3 and
1 1 2 . These three games all have the value 1 if player 1 begins. Combining
the first two, gives the game 1 2 0 1 3 , which has value 1¯ if player 1 begins,
while combining the second two gives the game 1 1 2 0 1 3 , which has value
1 if player 1 begins. While all components can be won by player 1 if they begin,
player 1 can not begin in both games at once. Additional information is thus
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required to allow for a simple calculation of disjunctive sums, such as the options
for the other players.
A logical next step would be to see how our simplification rules perform on games
with more than three players. Furthermore, as our simple values are simply a
means to simplify the notation of three-player games, it could be interesting to
attempt to find a similar useful notation, and a generalisation of Theorem 16,
for games with N > 3. A logical generalisation would be to keep the notation
from Section 4.1: ai = {bi−1 | b 6= a}. Using this notation, in a four-player game,
we would have 21 = {1, 3, 4}. However, there would be no simple notation for,
for instance, {1, 4}, so it remains to be seen how useful this notation would be.
Our final suggestion would be to devise more player preferences — a risky or
paranoid player, for instance — and to mix several types of players to research
the effects of different combinations. We have now assumed all players to have
the same preference to experience the full effects of those specific rulesets, but
naturally this is not always the case.
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